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Ethics And The New

tyle Candidate Pollster

BRUCE E. ALTSCHULER
SUNYOswego

Everywhere the American public turns, it seems to find itself explained
by one sort of poll or another. For many years George Gallup and Louis
Harris have been selling their surveys to newspapers. Now every newspaPer
and television station seems to have its own survey on every subjec t. Then
there are the Nielsen ratings to tell us what we watch on televisio n, market
research to tell business what we will buy, the wire service polls to tell us
who the best college football team is, a poll of historians to tell us which
Presidents succeeded and which failed, while everyone seems to be taking a
poll to let us know who we want as our next President, even if we have just
finished electing the last one. So flooded are we with polls that it is ea y 10
forget that polling is a very recent phenomenon. Truly systematic political
polls are only about fifty years old. Polls taken for political ca nd idates did
not come into significant use until the l 940's and have only beco me an im.
portant part of most campaigns in the last twenty years.' Typica lly a candidate would hire a polling firm to take and analyze surveys. Mos t polling
reports consisted of the presentation of simple trial heat resu lts together
with cross-tabulations concerning key groups and major issues, with occasional panel studies. When the campaign ended, the pollster wou ld return to
his other clients while the candidate, win or lose, would not be likely to consult professionally with the pollster until the next campaign.
Since then, the role of those who take polls for candidates ha changed
dramatically. Because of the difficulty of obtaining full and hone t information about the internal workings of political campaigns, the significance
of these changes has been largely ignored. 2 This article exa mine s the e
changes and their implications, including a number of possib le danger
caused by the changed role of private campaign pollsters.
The most important change has been the growth in the im portance of
both the polls and the poll takers. In 1968, $6 million was spe nt by candidates for 1200 polls . In 1980, the two major party president ia l candidate
each spent more than a million dollars, with a total spent by all candidate
for office of approximately $20 million for 2000 polls. 3
There are several reasons for this increase. Some is due to the inflation
that has increased all campaign costs. The rest is caused by changes in campaigns and polls. The modern campaign has created a need for the type of
information provided by polls. On the presidential level, there ha been a
sharp increase in the number of important primaries, requiring candidate
to have knowledge of an intricate set of rules. As a result, eac h candidate
has more choices to make, increasing the need for reliable and detailed information. On all levels, increased reliance on television has ca used candidates to utilize polls to develop and refine their strategy. Most ca ndidate ,
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ke a poll to help determine strategy. In 1980, when John Connally sought
ta recruit Lee Atwater to manage his South Carolina primary effort, the latto after studying thirteen state polls, decided that Connally's large
ier;atives (only 26% viewed him positively compared to 37% who had
n:gative views) meant certain defeat so he declined the offer.• Lowell
~eicker announced his presidential candidacy in March 1979 but withdrew
only two months later, citing a poll which showed him trailing Gerald Ford
and Ronald Reagan, but ahead of four other contenders, in his home state
of Connecticut. 5 Since Ford was never to become a candidate, this appears,
in retrospect, not to have been as serious as Weicker claimed but the weak
poll results had negative effects on fund raising and press coverage. For the
more successful efforts of Reagan and Carter, as will be discussed later,
tracegy memos were drawn up by the pollsters themselves.
Also adding to the cost of polls has been their increasingly sophisticated methodology. Instead of the simple trial heats and cross-tabs,
there is now considerable use of more complex statistical methods such as
multidimensional scaling. 6 Also common is the daily tracking survey, used
by both Carter and Reagan to measure progress. Even the questioning has
become more sophisticated. Instead of simply asking people how they intended to vote, Patrick Caddell, Jimmy Carter's pollster, followed up by
asking a series of specific questions so as to make the respondent think more
eriously about his vote (as he would on primary or election day). When a
second candidate choice question was then posed, the result was often a
changed response. These second response figures revealed potential dangers
and opportunities hidden by simple trial heat polls. During the New Hamphire primary, while published polls showed a large Carter lead, the adjusted totals indicated that Senator Kennedy was closing the gap . Potential
Kennedy voters admired the Camp David agreement but had let it fade from
memory. As a result of these findings, new advertisements emphasized the
achievement of Camp David. The adjusted figures then shifted to a 49-38%
margin for Carter, virtually identical to the actual vote. In the later New
York and Pennsylvania primaries, Caddell's adjusted figures also indicated
that large Carter leads in the public polls were melting away but changes in
campaign strategy did not prevent Kennedy from winning both primaries. 1
Few candidates can afford the full range of services. Because they are
not experts in polling techniques, they must rely on the pollster to decide
what to sacrifice in accuracy in order to keep down costs, making the decision about which pollster to hire a crucial one. According to Charles Roll
and Albert Cantril, political candidates are poorly equipped to make this
decision intelligently. "Candidates are almost always impressed by the
previous clients a polling firm has worked for. Flattery and inside
dopesterism often pique a candidate's interest. Also, cost considerations are
frequently decisive. In the research profession, while there are rare excep129

tions, the best salesmen do not make the best researchers a nd the b
researchers are poor salesmen. " 8 Since the pollster must make a number est
important decisions-whom
to interview, whether (and how) to adjust t~f
results, what size the sample should be, how to phrase the questi on s Wh e
1
alternatives to ask about, and the order of the questions-as
well as' bei:
responsible for the interpretation of the data, he has considerable influen/
within the campaign.
e
The most significant change, however, has been in the role of th
pollster. At first, the pollster was essentially a consultant who was hired 1~
take surveys, provide analysis, and leave the rest to the campaign staff. This
first changed during John Kennedy's 1960 presidential campaig n . Louis
Harris was not only his pollster but also an important campaig n adviser
After the election, he stayed on as an adviser to President Kennedy:
However, differences between Harris and other advisers, which had begun
during the campaign, soon led to Harris' return to private life. He has since
left candidate polling entirely and is now a leading public pollste r. 9
In today's campaigns, the pollster has more influence tha n Harris
could have dreamed of in 1960. In the most successful recent pres idential
campaigns, the pollsters have been members of the inner circle of advi sers.
This is well illustrated by Richard Wirthlin and Patrick Cad dell. When
Ronald Reagan fired campaign manager John Sears after the New Hamp.
shire primary, pollster Wirthlin became his chief strategist. An indication of
his importance is the fact that he, along with Sears' successor Willia m Casey
and Edwin Meese, represented Reagan in the unsuccessful negot iation s to
persuade Gerald Ford to accept the vice-presidential nomination. 10 After
the convention, Wirthlin was put in charge of writing Reagan's campaign
plan. He produced a 100 page report outlining twenty-one "con dition s of
victory," later reduced to a simpler seven. During the general elect ion campaign he sent a series of memoranda on the major issues to Reaga n 's other
top advisers. 11
Carter's pollster, Patrick Caddell, played a similar role in bot h 1976
and 1980. In late June 1980, he wrote a "first cut at a genera l election
strategy." Because he had little polling data except for the recen t primary
states, Caddell went far beyond the pollster's role, admitting that " much of
this memorandum is based on hunch, experience, and theory." 12 Like Wirthlin,
he wrote a series of memos suggesting strategy for the campaign.
When their candidates succeeded, both Caddell and Wirthlin continued
to provide advice. During the Carter administration, Caddell ofte n ad vised
the President although he was never officially a member of the White Hou se
staff. Wirthlin has been even more active since Reagan was electe d. The
Republican National Committee hired his firm to conduct surveys both for
it and the White House, for a yearly fee of nearly a million dollars . According to Wirthlin, these polls influenced such decisions as President Reagan' s
televised suggestion to the public to write to members of Congress urging
support for his economic program, his deemphasis of the EI Salvado r issue,
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d his retreat from proposals to reduce Social Security benefits. ' 3
an The multiple roles of the new style pollster create a series of potential
flicts of interest that may prove harmful to the political process. The re:~nder of this article will discuss these conflicts and suggest possible
remedie .
pollster Mervin Field believes that combining the roles of researcher
nd political decision-maker results in a weakened performance in both for
\ ,
reasons. First, because "good research methodologists are not
0
~ece sarily good policy-makers and vice-versa." Second, because "Political
ampaigns are intense pressure cookers. A person who is both a researcher
:nd a counselor during a political campaign usually finds the research comonent of this hybrid combination the first to be impaired.""
p Pollsters generally have political experience that is limited to campaigning rather than governing. Their experience is in the measurement and
analysis of opinion, not in the substance of policy. It is therefore not surpri ing to ee them advising candidates and office-holders to concentrate on
image and public relations rather than substance. Shortly before Jimmy
carter's inauguration, Caddell sent him a memo urging him to stress style
over substance. "Too many good people have been beaten because they
tried to substitute substance for style," he wrote." Late in Carter's term,
the President delivered a "crisis of confidence" speech at Caddell's urging,
rejecting Vice-President Mondale's view that Caddell's memo was "crazy",
and that the country needed a statement about energy and the economy, not
a tecture. ' 6 Similarly, in a campaign memo, Wirthlin discussed how to
reconcile differences between Ronald Reagan's views and those of the
public. Reagan has won the nomination "not" because his ideological position were congruent with the electorate, but rather in spite of a rather subtantial ideological gap between himself and the average Republican."
Wirthlin sought to close this gap not by discussing policy but "by rounding
out the total perception of Ronald Reagan as a more human, warm, approachable individual." 11
Treating problems of substance as merely problems of image can result
in poor public policy. A candidate may convince the public that his program
i worth a try but once in office he will be judged by results. No matter how
effectively a program is sold, if public support is to be maintained, it must
be worth selling .
The multiple roles of the pollster- "objective" data collector and
analyst, campaign adviser, post-election adviser, and poll talker for other
clients-produce a real conflict of interest. In the past, when a pollster was
imply hired to take and analyze surveys, he could do so with little conflict
of interest because he was not really part of the campaign organization. He
did have some stake in the outcome since the success of the candidate he
worked for could enhance his reputation, thereby improving his business.
ow that the pollster is an important staff member, the temptations for him
to be less objective are far greater.
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The traditional view is that the election will force him to be objective
As pollster Peter Hart puts it, "In political polling, impartiality means tha·
you have not tried to load up favorable thing for your candida te. If wt
deliver good news to our clients and it is not accurate, we are out 0 ;
business." 11 This theory is far too naive to fit the reality of pol itical carnpaigns. A lack of objectivity or profes ionalism may actually help a candidate get elected.
This paradox i explained by the fact that polls are not take n simply to
inform the candidate. Polls are frequently leaked for tactical reasons-to
help raise funds, to mislead or di courage opponents and thei r supporters
or to influence press coverage. ' 9 An extreme example occurred during on;
Senate campaign when a polling firm, anxious to get a candidate's bu ine
offered to produce two surveys-a legitimate one for use by the candidat;
and a more favorable one to be leaked to the press and po ible contributors. 20 What obligation does the poll taker have if his clien t leaks partial poll results that are false or misleading? In 1979, the Natio nal Council
on Public Polls, a voluntary association of leading polling org ani zation
adopted a code requiring private pollsters to release the sponso rship, inter'.
view dates, method of interviewing, population sampled, size of the sample
and sub-samples, complete question wording, and exact percentag es used in
analysis whenever the pollster or client release partial results. This leaves
release to the discretion of the polling firm, especially if the leak is attributed in a news report as coming from an anonymous source. How many
pollsters will be willing to antagonize current and future clients by sabotaging their strategic leaks? What if the pollster is part of the cam pa ign staff
that decided to leak or, worse yet, if himself the leaker? Since the Council i
a voluntary organization, it can do little to enforce its regulations, especially
against non-members. In fact, Caddell's firm, Cambridge Survey Re earch,
resigned from the Council, claiming that the new rules would violate contracts with corporate clients. According to John Gorman, the firm'
treasurer, "We're not happy to get into the role of policing ou r clients." 2 '
Polls may also be taken in order to influence the public. Member of
Congress mail hundreds of thousands of questionnaires to their constitutents. Although most professionals scoff at them, such " polls" make
voters feel that their views are listened to by their representa tives who can
also use the results to justify votes that agree with the results. Even the
leading pollsters are not above such tactics, as illustrated by the following
question taken from the 1982 Ohio gubernatorial primary. Po lls taken for
Will iam Brown asked:
As you may know, in 1974 (Jerry Springer), who had gotten married six months earlier, was arrested on a morals charge with three
women in a hotel room. He also used a bad check to pay for the
women's services, and subsequently resigned as Mayor of his city. Doe
this make you much more likely, somewhat more likely, some what le s
likely, or much less likely to support (him) for governor th is year?
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ch a loaded question would not even be considered by a pollster in~ested in accurately measuring public opinion but could be used to affect
t~e vote of those questioned. Furthermore,
the question contained
1
urnerous inaccuracies-Springer
was not arrested, only one woman was in~olved, the incident occurred before he was elected Mayor and was public
knowledge before his election to that office, the check did not bounce, the
·ncident took place in a health club not a hotel, and he was married 18 months
~ot six. This poll was not done by some fly-by-night pollster but by the firm
of Patrick Caddell who, in a later interview, accepted the blame. 22
A pollster who is an adviser may also find himself tempted to tailor his
poll taking to support his advice. Every campaign has disagreements among
advisers over strategy. Since even slight alterations in wording can affect
urvey results, a pollster may, consciously or not, draw up questions or
amples to back up his own positions. The apparent objectivity of numbers
can make it hard to argue with them, especially against the campaign's chief
expert on the subject.
finally, it must be remembered that most pollsters have other clients,
including private corporations and foreign governments. In fact, special interests are probably the largest single customers for polling firms. 23
Caddell's clients have included, in addition to numerous candidates, Con
Edison, Exxon, Westinghouse, and Sears. 2• For members of the White
House staff, similar involvement could violate conflict of interest laws, but
pollster-advisers are not government employees so these laws do not apply
to them.
Many interest groups now hire pollsters themselves and turn the results
over to candidates, a procedure which enables them to increase the value of
their contributions allowed by law. For example, AMP AC, representing the
merican Medical Association, spent $381,000 for polls in 36 congressional
districts which they then donated to candidates. 21 Unlike a candidate, an interest group does not benefit simply from winning an election. Unless a candidate supports their positions, his victory will not help them. Interest
groups therefore have a real incentive, no matter how objective their other
questions may be, to stack questions on the issues of concern to them to
reach a predetermined result or to interpret results in favor of their position.
Robert Cameron Mitchell cites a December 1979 Washington Post advertisement placed by the American Nuclear Energy Council as one which
deliberately exaggerated the support for nuclear power shown in a poll they
commissioned. 26 Since polls donated to candidates are rarely made public,
the extent of biased polls or misinterpretations can only be surmised.
ls there anything that can be done to prevent or lessen these abuses?
Possible reforms include the following:
l. Voluntary measures. We have already discussed the efforts of the
ational Council on Public Polls to encourage full and accurate disclosure
of polls. Developing a more comprehensive code by the Council and other
associations of pollsters is one approach but its disadvantages were also
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pointed out. This approach was taken by the American Ass ociation f
Political Consultants in 1975 with little impact. According to Larr y Sabato
"Most of the AAPC code is too generalized and vague to be enforceabi°'
but some clauses potentially could be if the will to do so were the/•
Although the code provides for an investigating mechanism (clau se 16) ~has not once been invoked, nor is it likely to be. " 21 There is little reason'
expect pollsters to have better results than consultants, especia lly since sorn~
consultants are also pollsters.
2. Disclosure. A second possibility is to require more complete
disclosure by pollsters. The simplest method would require all pollster
s
working for candidates to register with the Federal Elections Commission
(or equivalent state agency for state elections) and include such data as a list
of clients and fees. In this way, the press and opposing can didate s could
make an issue of any conflicts of interest. Another approach would be to require all polls taken for candidates to be deposited in a central archive
shortly after the election . The press and academics could the n publicize
shortcomings (as well as good points) of particular polls and poll sters. An
additional advantage of this approach is that it would provide the information needed for adding to the very small number of studi es of private
political polling.
Either approach would require a more thorough know ledge of polls
than most reporters currently have. However, many newspa pers are giving
reporters more training or, as is the case with the Washingto n Post, hiring
their own in-house pollsters to cover public opinion and po lling stories.
3. Pollster accrediation. Pollsters could be accredite d by an impartial
board. Even if accreditation were voluntary, accredited po llsters would
possess an advantage in attracting clients. A code of ethics could then be
drawn up which accredited pollsters would have to pledge to abide by.
Complaints against pollsters would be investigated by the bo ard. Justified
complaints could result in public censure or a loss of accredita tion.
This approach raises a number of difficult administrativ e problems.
Would the board be a private or a government agency? Who would serve on
it and how would they be selected? What standards woul d be used for
accreditation?
Modern technology has revolutionized the political camp aign . If we do
not give serious thought to the dangers posed, we will have only our selves to
blame for the consequences.

/t
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